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ABSTRACT: The global financial crisis of 2008 sparked an ongoing debate concerning the 
interlink between monetary policy and equity returns. This study contributes to the debate by 
examining whether the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) repo rate responds 
asymmetrically to changes in the returns on four equity indices on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). Our empirical model is the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) 
model which is applied to monthly data corresponding to periods before the financial crisis 
(2002:01 - 2008:08) and periods after the crisis (2008:08 - 2016:12). There are three main 
findings which can be derived from our empirical analysis. Firstly, we significant negative 
relationship between equity prices to the repo rate before the crisis and this relationship turns 
insignificant in periods after the crisis. Secondly, we find that the Reserve Bank mainly 
monitored positive disturbances to equity indices before the crisis whereas after the crisis the 
Reserve Bank appears to be more responsive to negative equity deviations. Lastly, we find 
significant error correcting behaviour in periods before the crisis but not afterwards. Overall, 
our results indicate that the SARB appears to have been responsive to equity returns prior to 
the crisis but not for subsequent periods.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent global financial crisis of 2008-2009, caused by a crash of the US financial 
system, has been dubbed as the worst financial crisis experienced since the Great Depression. 
The US Federal Reserve responded to the crisis by adopting quantitative easing monetary 
policies in which interest rates were gradually lowered to what is popularly known as the ‘zero 
lower bound’. In December 2015, the Feds announced it’s first raise in interest rates in over 9 
years and it is anticipated that the Federal Reserve will continue to do so in the near future. 
Due to increasing levels of global financial integration it is expected that the increase in the 
Federal rate will propagate into financial markets in both developed and emerging economies. 
Phiri (2016) has recently shown that future increases in the federal fund rates will eventually 
propagate towards stock market activity for 5 SSA countries inclusive of South Africa. 
Following this line of thought, it would be interesting to know whether or not the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) will in turn responds to changes in equity returns. So far, the theoretical 
literature has identified two channels through which changes in interest rates are linked with 
the stock market (Moya-Martinez et. al., 2015). Firstly, interest rates are directly linked to the 
discount rate which is used for equity evaluation purposes. Secondly, interest rate movements 
are linked to a firms’ expectations about future cash flows by altering the cost of financing.  
 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted which examine the correlation 
between monetary policy instrument and equity returns and these studies are inclusive of Das 
(2005) for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; Faff et. al. (2005) for Australia; Hatemi-J and Roca 
(2008) for Australia, the US, the UK and Canada; Laopodis (2010) for the US; Kasman et. al. 
(2011) for Turkey and Moya-Martinez et. al. (2015) for Spain. Notably, most of these studies 
use linear empirical frameworks and have been conducted for European, Asian and North 
American economies with a limited amount of contemporary literature concerning African 
countries, and in particular Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (see Adjasi and Biekpe 
(2006) for a rare case study of South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Tunisia and 
Mauritius). Of recent, advances in econometric estimation techniques have enabled researchers 
to model the transmission of monetary policy actions through to the stock market as a nonlinear 
process. Evidence of interest rates-stock returns nonlinearity is documented in the works of 
Arango et. al. (2002) for Columbia; Chen (2007) for the US; Ballester et. al. (2011); Akbas 
(2013) for Turkey and Sheng-Yeh et. al. (2014) for G8 countries. Such documented 
nonlinearity can be treated as being theoretically plausible since financial markets are complex 
systems characterized by various heterogeneous agents who do not behave simultaneously but 
collectively determine aggregate market behaviour (Moya-Martinez et. al., 2015). Once again, 
we note that the evidence of nonlinearity between interest rates and stock returns is abundant 
for other international economies with none existing for SSA countries.  
 
We observe that the aforementioned previous nonlinear studies do not consider the 
possibility of nonlinear convergence between interest rates and equity returns. However, it is 
well known from Engle and Granger’s (1987) cointegration theorem that establishing the 
presence of long-run equilibrium adjustment between time series variables is important for 
avoiding the problem of spurious regressions obtained from estimating any long-run equations 
formed from nonstationary time series. It is thus important for studies investigating 
nonlinearities to account for asymmetric equilibrium convergence between the time series. 
Moreover, previous nonlinear studies strictly rely on aggregated measures of stock market 
development which robs them of distinguishing the varying effects which monetary policy 
instruments exert on different sectors of a stock exchange. This importance of using 
disaggregated measures of stock returns is demonstrated in the study of Geyser and Lowies 
(2001) who find that inflation is positively related with mining equities of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) and yet negatively related with other equities listed under other sectors. 
Inevitably, such evidence indicates that while equities listed under the JSE are correlated with 
monetary policy outcomes, the degree of correlation differs from one sector to the next. 
 
In our study, we investigate the nonlinear equilibrium adjustment mechanics between 
the repo rate and five main stock market indices on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
returns using monthly data collected from 2002:01 to 2016:12 which is further disseminated 
into data corresponding to periods before (2002:01 - 2008:08) and periods after the crisis 
(2008:08 - 2016:12). The four generalized JSE stock indices covered in the study are the All 
Share index (ALSI), the top 40 index, the industrials index and the resource index. 
Methodologically, we rely on the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) model which 
has been successful used in describing the asymmetric adjustment behaviour between interest 
rates and other financial variables such as between interest rates and inflation (Maki, 2005), 
between interest rates and commercial bank rates (Matemilola et. al., 2015); between interest 
rates and mortgage prices (Becker et. al., 2012) as well as between the term structure of interest 
rates (Iyke, 2015). What is most recommendable about the MTAR model is that it allows for 
differing responses in equilibrium adjustment behaviour depending on whether deviations of 
equilibrium errors from the steady-state are negative or positive. This is particularly important 
when financial market rigidities exist in the transmission of policy instrument towards capital 
markets. For instance, monetary authorities might be more tolerant of falling interest rates than 
rising ones and this will have varying effects on financial markets depending on whether 
interest rates are below or above their steady-state equilibrium (Enders and Silkos, 2001). 
Ultimately, this assumption is consistent with the notion of asymmetric monetary policy 
conduct which has been already been documented for the SARB in the study of Kasai and 
Naraidoo (2012). However, it is yet to be proven as to whether the SARB policy instrument 
(i.e. the repo rate) and disaggregated stock returns adjust to a common market-clearing 
equilibrium in an asymmetric fashion. Our research efforts intend on empirically addressing 
this issue.  
 
Our manuscript is divided into six sections which have been written as follows. The 
background to our study has been given in this first section of the paper. The next section 
provides an overview of developments in the South African stock market as well as an 
overview of monetary policy instrument used by the Reserve Bank. A review of the associated 
literature is presented in the third section of the article. In the fourth section we detail our 
empirical model and present the empirical data. The empirical study is conducted in section 
five whereas the study is concluded in the sixth section of the paper. 
 
2 OVERVIEW OF STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND 
MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
2.1 An overview of stock market development in South Africa 
 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is South Africa’s sole stock exchange and 
was formed in 1887 thus rendering it as Africa’s second oldest stock exchange after the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). The JSE was established following the discovery of gold 
deposits in Witwatersrand reef between 1884 and 1886, and the stock exchange was used to 
facilitate for the large capital investments injected into the then growing mining industry. 
Currently, the JSE operates in equity, derivative and debt markets, trades over 900 securities 
and is the 17th largest stock exchange in the world with a market capitalization of 11.9 trillion 
ZAR in 2014. Also as of 2014, 394 firms were listed on the JSE, with 331 listed on the JSE 
main board and the remaining 62 firms being the AltX board, with the latter being designed to 
provide capital for small and medium sized firms. In addition to this, the JSE cross-lists a 
number of firms on her exchange and also conducts trades on international platforms such as 
in London, New York, Frankfurt and Zurich (Nyasha and Odhiambo, 2015). Categorically, the 
stock exchange can be grouped into eleven broad sectors namely, i) resources ii) basic 
industries iii) general industries iv) cyclical consumer goods v) non-cyclical consumer goods 
vi) cyclical services vii) non-cyclical services viii) utilities ix) financials x) information 
technology xi) specialist securities. The JSE also lists its trading equity stocks under four 
generalized stock indices i.e. the All Share index (ALSI), the top 40 index, the industrials index 
and the resource index.  
 
Since the historic political reformation of the South African economy into a democratic 
state in 1994, the JSE experienced her most significant changes in the trading platform used by 
the stock exchange. For convenience sake, one can identify four transitional shifts in the trading 
mechanisms or platforms for trading equity stocks on the JSE since 1994. The first change took 
place in 1996 when the stock exchange gradually phased out tradition open outcry auctions and 
replaced this with a fully automated trading system, the JSE Equity Trading (JET) system. The 
second change took place in 2001, when the JSE adopted the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
trading platform, the LSE Stock Exchange electronic trading system (SETS) and started 
conducting all equity trading activity under this trading platform. The third change came about 
in 2007, when the LSE leased yet another trading platform to JSE, the JSE TradeElect trading 
system. The fourth change came in 2013, when the JSE decided on moving the trading platform 
from London to back to Johannesburg under a new trading platform, the Millennium exchange 
trading platform (Yartley, 2008). It is under the Millennium exchange trading platform that the 
JSE introduced collation facilities as a trading option on the stock exchange. This has resulted 
in the most significant development in the JSE in terms efficiency and effectiveness of equity 
trading and this evident since the operational speed of which transactions are executed under 
collation is approximately 400 times faster than before. 
  
2.2 An overview of monetary policy instrument in South Africa 
 
Currently, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) adheres to an inflation target 
regime of 3 to 6 percent, which it adopted in 2002, and uses the repo rate as a short-term policy 
instrument to keep inflation within it’s designated target range. The inflation index which the 
Reserve Bank targets is the CPIX and this is defined as an annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index (CPI) exclusive of the changes in the interest costs of mortgage bonds. 
When CPIX inflation breaches the 6 percent upper boundary of the target range, the Reserve 
Bank will raise its repo rate to curb inflation expectations as well as to make it more expensive 
for the banks to borrow money and thus restrict banking activities (Matemilola et. al., 2015). 
This, in turn, lowers consumption and investment activities by economic entities, which then 
lowers aggregate demand and ultimately causes a reduction in the inflation rate. On the other 
hand, when inflation is below the lower limit of the inflation target (i.e. 3 percent), then the 
Reserve Bank will lower the repo rate as a means of inducing expansionary monetary policy, 
and the effects are transmitted through the economy in an opposite fashion to the mechanism 
previously described. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank, which 
consists of seven members, inclusive of and headed by the Reserve Bank governor, has been 
delegated direct responsibility for ensuring that inflation remains within it’s set target. The 
MPC meets six times a year to discuss developments and after projecting inflation forecasts, 
the committee decides on whether to make any adjustments on the repo rate or not. As a means 
of enhancing Central Bank transparency, the SARB’s produces inflation forecasts of a horizon 
up to 24 months which are then published in the Monetary Policy Review (MPR). This 
publication is released bi-annually in June and November and is easily accessible from the 
Reserve Banks website online. 
 
However, it should be noted that the Reserve Bank did not start to place emphasis on 
interest rates as a direct policy instrument until 1985 following recommendations by the De 
Kok Commission which influenced the SARB to adopt monetary supply targets as an official 
policy mandate. Under the money supply targeting framework, the Reserve Bank’s maintained 
a market oriented approach to policy conduct and redefined the role of the discount rate as the 
main policy instrument. The discount rate was used to influence the cost of overnight 
collaterized lending and ultimately affect market interest rates (Naraidoo and Gupta, 2007). By 
creating a persistent money market shortage and setting the bank rate at a relatively high level, 
the commercial bank rates were typically closely linked to the bank rate (Aron and Meullbauer, 
2007). And yet the usefulness of money supply targets were diminished following extensive 
financial liberalization in the 1980’s and a more open capital account from 1994 onwards 
(Phiri, 2016). Hereafter, the Reserve Bank switched to money supply guidelines which were 
similar to money supply targets except that the focus was on keeping M3 money supply within 
a predetermined target and this policy was later supplemented by an eclectic set of broad 
economic indicators including changes in bank credit extension, overall liquidity in the banking 
system, the yield curve, the overall balance-of-payments position, the exchange rate and 
movement in the rate of inflation (Van der Merwe, 2004). And yet, the SARB reached a 
milestone in it’s approach to policy conduct in 1998 by introducing a system of monetary 
accommodation. Under this framework the Reserve Bank conducts monetary policy by 
engaging in tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions (Aron and Meullbauer, 2007). 
This system of ‘repo transactions’ would completely phase out money supply guidelines and 
officially usher in the current inflation targeting regime. 
 
In practice, the repo rate is the rate at which the SARB buys back securities it had 
previously sold in the money markets to commercial banks and is also the rate at which the 
Reserve Bank lends or discounts eligible papers for deposit money banks (Matemilola et. al., 
2015). As part of it’s operational mandate, the Reserve Bank engages in daily transactions 
which involves the buying of securities from commercial banks in return for funds. These 
borrowed funds are made against an obligation to purchase back these securities at a fixed price 
at a future date, which is currently set at seven days after the purchase of the securities has 
taken place (Dube and Zhou, 2013). In order to maintain a healthy profit margin, commercial 
banks then charge a higher interest to their customers than the repo rate charged by the Reserve 
Bank and the interest rate used between the banks and their customers is known as the prime 
lending rate. The interbank market, which is a market for loans and deposits amongst 
commercial banks, also plays a key role in the SARB monetary transmission mechanism 
because the interbank interest rates, along with other money market interest rates, respond 
immediately to any adjustments in the repo rate (Aziakpono et. al., 2007). When necessary, the 
Reserve Bank can also engage in other types of discrete auctions with commercial banks as a 
means of stabilizing interbank rates and accommodating liquidity requirements (Fadiran and 
Edun, 2013). All-in-all, the repo transactions system used by the SARB is intended to provide 
continuous signals to the banking institutions concerning the amount of liquidity that the 
Reserve Bank is willing to make available on a daily tendering basis.  
 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The investigation into the relationship between interest rates and stock markets has been 
primarily dominated by studies which rely on linear analytical frameworks. In early studies, 
such as in Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Kandel and Stambaugh (1990), Thorbecke (1997) and 
Patelis (1997), a consensus had been drawn which contended for a positive relationship 
between the time series variables. However, following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
an increasing number of authors have since advocated for a negative relationship between the 
variables (Farka (2009), Li et. al. (2010), Kasman et. al. (2011), Pirovano (2012), Moya-
Martinez et. al. (2015)). And even more recent, it has been speculated that the relationship 
between interest rates and stock market development is most likely nonlinear. This nonlinear 
relationship between interest rates and stock markets is reminiscent of imperfect markets 
existing in the finance constrained theory (Bui, 2015). Empirically, there are three main groups 
of research studies advocating for a nonlinear interest rate-stock returns relationship. Firstly, 
are studies which find that the effects of monetary policy stance on the stock exchange depends 
on whether a stock exchange is in a ‘bulls’ or ‘bears’ phase of the market. Belonging to this 
cluster of studies are the works of Perez-Quiros and Timmermann for the US (2000), Arango 
et. al. (2002), Chen (2007) for the US; Henry (2009) for the UK; Konrad (2009) for Germany; 
Jansen and Tsai (2010) for the US; Kurov (2010) for the US; Zare et. al. (2013) for ASEAN5 
countries (i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand), Ravn (2014) for 
the US; Han. et. al. (2015) for China, Li (2015) for China and also Bui (2015) for ASEAN5 
countries. Incidentally, the aforementioned studies indicate that monetary policy exerts a larger 
effect on stock market development during periods of bear markets and has smaller effects 
during bull periods albeit for differing economies, using different econometric techniques and 
different measures of monetary policy stance as well as stock market development in reaching 
this conclusion.  
 
The second group of nonlinear studies argue that the interest rate-stock returns 
relationship varies during different phases of the business cycle. Inclusive of these studies are 
the works of Guo (2004), Anderson et. al. (2007), Basistha and Kurov (2008), Hess et. al. 
(2008) and Vahamaa and Aijo (2011). Notably, the empirical results obtained from this cluster 
of studies appears to be more ambiguous in nature. For instance, Guo (2004) investigates the 
effect of the federal funds rate on large firms and small firms between two sample periods; 
1974-1979 (i.e. bad business conditions) and 1988-2000 (i.e. good business conditions) using 
simple OLS regressions. The authors find that stocks from small firms were more sensitive to 
the federal funds rate than stocks from large firms during periods of bad business conditions 
whereas these effects disappear altogether during periods good business conditions.  On the 
other hand, Anderson et. al. (2007) examine the effects of changes in monetary policy stance 
on bond and equity markets in the US, German and the UK from 1992-2002 and find that bad 
macroeconomic news has a negative effect on stock markets during contractionary periods and 
this effect turns positive during expansionary periods. Conversely, the authors find that ‘good 
news’ during expansions has a negative impact on stock returns and a positive effect during 
contractions. Using firm level-data, Basistha and Kurov (2008) find that effect of an 
unexpected or ‘surprise’ change in the feds funds target rate is twice as large during recessions 
in comparison to responses during expansionary periods. The authors also show that financial 
constrained firms are more sensitive to monetary shocks during recessions in comparison to 
those exhibited by financially unconstrained firms.  In another study, Hess et. al. (2008) find 
that the US stock markets respond positively to news about inflation and real activity during 
recessions whereas no significant reactions are found to exist during expansionary periods. In 
taking a different approach, Vahamaa and Aijo (2011) investigate the impact of both scheduled 
(unsurprised) and unscheduled (surprise) monetary policy announcements on the US stock 
market and find that the effects both types of monetary policy announcements are more 
prolonged during expansions than contractionary periods.  
 
The third group of nonlinear studies are those which examine the effects of monetary 
policy instrument on stock returns depending upon the direction of monetary policy 
developments. Research conducted by Lobo (2002), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Chulia-
Soler et. al. (2010) and Laopodis (2013) all belong to this criteria of empirical studies. Lobo 
(2002) studies the effects of monetary policy surprises on stock price volatility and discovers 
that a surprise announcement of an interest rate hike by the Fed’s results in an immediate 
increase in stock market volatility, with the increase in volatility quickly reverting back to it’s 
‘pre-announcement’ level on the day following the announcement. Similarly, Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) observe that an unanticipated decrease in the federal funds rate will have a 
positive impact on the US stock market. In particular, the authors find that a ‘surprise’ 25-
basis-points reduction in the federal funds rate will result in a 1 percentage increase in 
aggregate stock price returns. On the other hand, Chulia-Soler et. al. (2010) find that a surprise 
increase in federal funds rate of 25 basis-points will lead to an increase in volatility in the US 
stock market returns by 113 basis points and this change in stock price volatility will occur in 
less than 5 minutes. Furthermore, the empirical study also reveals that surprises hikes in interest 
rates will lead to stronger decrease in stock price returns in comparison to an increase in stock 
price as caused by a surprise reduction in interest rates. Laopodis (2013) investigates the effects 
of monetary policy on stock market performance during three monetary policy regimes in the 
US i.e. Burns (1970-1978), Volcker (1979-1987) and Greenspan (1988-2003) and finds that 
the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns has been different in each of the 
aforementioned regimes. Nevertheless, Laopodis (2013) finds that the effects of monetary 
policy on stock market performance was more pronounced during periods of bear markets than 
in periods of bull markets. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In investigating the relationship between the SARB monetary policy instrument and 
stock price returns in South Africa, we use the momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) 
model framework of Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Silkos (2001). Traditional 
cointegration techniques of Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991) assume symmetric 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and thus cannot differentiate between negative and 
positive shocks which can be best captured as asymmetric adjustments. The MTAR model 
allows for such asymmetric cointegration relations which, in our study, is derived from the 
following bi-variate long-run cointegration equation: 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 = 0 + 0𝑠𝑚𝑟𝑡 + 𝑡        (1) 
 
Where repot is the repo rate, smrt is the return on the stock market index and t is a 
well-behaved equilibrium error term. To instigate asymmetric cointegration, the long run 
residuals are modelled as the following threshold process: 
 
𝛥
𝑡
= 
1
𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 2𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑡       (2) 
 
Where 1 and 2, are coefficients of threshold equilibrium errors, It. is a Heaviside 
indicator function which dictates regime switching behaviour for the threshold equilibrium 
error terms and t ~ I.I.D. (0, 2). The absolute values of the coefficients 1 and 2 measure the 
speed of adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium after positive and negative shock, 
respectively. Enders and Siklos (2001) further propose that asymmetric cointegration can take 
the form of two possible functional forms. Firstly, there exists TAR cointegration in which the 
indicator function It assumes the following functional forms: 
 
𝐼𝑡 = ቊ
1 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏
0 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑡−1 < 𝜏
          (4) 
 
Secondly, there is MTAR cointegration in which the indictor function is specified in 
terms of the first differences of the threshold error terms hence allowing a variable to display 
varying amounts of autoregressive decay depending on whether it is increasing or decreasing: 
 
𝐼𝑡 = ቊ
1 𝑖𝑓 𝛥𝜇𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏
0 𝑖𝑓 𝛥𝜇𝑡−1 < 𝜏
         (5) 
  
Where Δ is a first difference operator. The threshold estimate τ is unknown a-prior and 
it’s consistent estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) methodology of searching over 
possible threshold values to minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS) from the fitted model. 
After obtaining the true threshold values, it is possible to estimate the TAR and MTAR 
cointegration models by respectively plugging equations (4) and (5) into (3). However, prior 
to doing so we must first verify convergence effects in these regressions. This occurs in a three-
staged process.  
 
i) Firstly, we visually inspect whether the following convergence condition has been 
satisfied: 1 < 0, 2 < 0 and (1 +1)(1 + 2) < 0. If this condition holds then the least 
squares estimates of 1 and 2 have an asymptotic multivariate distribution. 
ii) Secondly, we use standard F-statistics to test the null hypothesis of no convergence 
effects as H10: 1 = 2 = 0 and this is tested against the alternative of significant 
cointegration effects i.e. 1  2  0. The statistics are denoted as F-Max* for the 
TAR model and F-Max*(M) for the MTAR model. 
iii) Lastly, we use modified F-statistics to test null of linear cointegration effects (i.e. 
H20: 1 = 2) and this is tested against the alternative of threshold cointegration 
effects (i.e. 1  2). These statistics are denoted as * and *(M) for the TAR and 
MTAR model, respectively. 
 
Since the distribution of the F-statistics testing 1 = 2 = 0 and 1 = 2 are nonstandard, 
Enders and Siklos (2001) tabulate consistent critical values for this test. Once the absolute 
values of the F-statistics exceed their tabulated critical values reported in Enders and Siklos 
(2001), then one can proceed to model short-run and long-run cointegration relations as well 
as conduct causality tests based on the following threshold error correction (TEC):  
 
∆𝑠𝑚𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾11𝑡
− + 𝛾12𝑡
+ + σ 1𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + σ 1𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 (6) 
∆𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾2𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝛾22𝑡
+ + σ 2𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + σ 2𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 (7) 
 
 Where Δ is a first difference operator, 𝑍𝑡
− = 𝐼𝑡𝜇𝑡−1 and 𝑍𝑡
+ = (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝜇𝑡−1. From 
equations (6) and (7), the null hypothesis of no threshold error correction effects can be tested 
as H30: 𝛾1𝑖𝑡
− = 𝛾2𝑖𝑡
+ against the alternative of threshold cointegration effects i.e. 𝛾1𝑖𝑡
− ≠
𝛾2𝑖𝑡
+. The F-statistic testing the TEC effects hypothesis is denoted as FTEC. We also perform 
causality analysis for the time series by testing two causality hypotheses. The first null 
hypothesis of the return on the stock market index not leading the repo rate (i.e. H40: i = 0) 
whereas the second null test the hypothesis of the repo rate not causing return on the stock 
market index (i.e. H50: i = 0). The F-statistics which are responsible for granger causality are 
denoted as F[H40] and F[H50], respectively. 
 
5 DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Data properties and unit root tests 
 The empirical data used in our empirical study has been retrieved from the McGregor 
BFA online database and consists of monthly data collected for the FTSE/JSE All share index 
(ALSIt), FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (Top.40t), FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 index (Ind.25t), the 
FTSE/JSE Resource 10 index (Res.10t) and the repo rate (it). All empirical data has been 
collected for the post-inflation targeting era of 2002:01 to 2016:12 and is further 
disseminated/propagated into two sub-groups representative of periods before the sub-prime 
crisis (i.e. 2002:01 to 2008:08) and for periods subsequent to the crisis (i.e. 2008:08 to 
2016:12). Since our stock data is provided as an index we compute our equity returns (ert) 
variable for all stock market indices (smit) as: 
 
𝑒𝑟𝑡 =
𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡−1
𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡−1
100        (6) 
 
Where t is a time subscript. The descriptive statistics of our empirical data is provided 
in Table 1. As can be observed from Table 1, the repo rate had higher values of the mean [9.9], 
median [10], minimum [7], maximum [13.5] and standard deviation [2.1] in the pre-crisis 
compared to those in the post crisis i.e. mean [6.2], median [5.8], minimum [5], maximum [12] 
and standard deviation values [1.5]. This generally implies that the SARB has leaned more 
towards a less restrictive monetary policy approach in periods following the financial crisis. 
Similarly for the returns to all four share indices we find that the means, medians, minimum 
and maximum values are lower in the post-crisis period in comparison to the pre-crisis period. 
We also note that returns on the on the all share index has the highest mean [1.3], median [1.7], 
maximum [10] and the lowest minimum [-13.3] and standard deviation [5.5] in the pre-crisis 
period. However in the post crisis period, the returns on the industrial index had the highest 
mean [1.4], median [1.2] and maximum [0.3] values whilst also having the lowest minimum [-
13.9] and standard deviation [4.4] values. 
 
  
Table 1: Summary statistics of time series 
 time series mean median minimum maximum std. dev. 
 
 
Pre-crisis 
repo 9.9 10 7 13.5 2.1 
all.share 1.3 1.7 -13.3 10.0 5.5 
top.40 1.3 1.2 -14.3 14.7 5.7 
ind.25 0.9 1.4 -13.9 11.7 5.7 
res.10 1.9 1.7 -19.1 21.4 8.1 
       
 
 
Post-crisis 
repo 6.2 5.8 5 12 1.5 
all.share 0.8 1.0 -13.9 0.3 4.4 
top.40 0.7 0.5 -14.9 11.7 4.7 
ind.25 1.4 1.2 -10.9 11.6 4.1 
res.10 -0.4 -0.8 -22.6 16.4 7.4 
Source: Authors’ own computations 
 
Before we can make any analytical use of the time series it is imperative that we test 
for unit roots within the variables. Conventional unit root tests such as ADF and PP unit root 
tests may not suffice for this purpose since they are unable to discriminate between stationary 
and unit root processes. Therefore, a suitable alternative is the DF-GLS unit root test of Elliot 
et. al. (1996) which is a modification of the ADF test using generalized least squares (GLS) 
approach. In our study, the DF-GLS unit root test  is performed on each of the time series for 
periods before and after the financial crisis and the tests are performed with i) a constant and 
ii) with trend; and the results of this empirical exercise are reported in Table 2. As is evident in 
Table 2, in both sub-periods all the time series are first difference stationary variables. In 
particular, for both sub-periods all the time series cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root at all significance levels regardless of whether the test is performed with a drift or a trend. 
However, in their first differences, the time series reject the null hypothesis at a significance 
level of at least 10 percent for all the time series for periods prior to the crisis whereas the unit 
root null is reject at all critical levels for periods subsequent to the crisis. Overall, these unit 
root test results verify that the variables are integrated of order I(1) and thus permits us to 
proceed with formal threshold cointegration analysis. 
 
Table 2: DF-GLS unit root tests 
  pre-crisis  post-crisis  decision 
  drift trend  drift trend   
repot  -1.88 
[-2.96]*** 
-2.04 
[-2.99]*** 
 -0.90 
[-2.83]*** 
-1.34 
[-3.60]*** 
 I(1) 
ALSIt  -0.68 
[-3.48]*** 
-1.23 
[-5.55]*** 
 -0.76 
[-2.77]*** 
-0.49 
[-4.44]*** 
 I(1) 
Top.40t  -0.66 
[-2.64]*** 
-1.30 
[-4.53]*** 
 -0.21 
[-2.96]*** 
-0.02 
[-4.73]*** 
 I(1) 
Ind.25t  -1.94 
[-2.61]** 
-1.96 
[4.93]*** 
 -0.32 
[-4.54]*** 
-0.45 
[-6.88]*** 
 I(1) 
Res.10t  -0.73 
 [-1.71]* 
-1.55 
[-3.39]** 
 -1.48 
[-2.66]*** 
-1.05 
[-5.86]*** 
 I(1) 
Note: “***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1, 5 and 10 percent critical levels, respectively. First difference statistics reported in []. 
 
5.2 Cointegration analysis 
 
Having confirmed first difference stationary in the time series, we proceed to carry out 
our empirical estimations of the TAR and MTAR models between the repo rate and the return 
on the stock market indices. However, prior to estimating any of these models we need to verify 
which of the threshold models contain significant asymmetric convergence effects. To recall, 
there are three prescribed hypotheses which are performed to this end. Firstly, we test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration effects (i.e. H10: 1 = 2 = 0) and this hypothesis is tested using 
the t-Max* and t-Max*(M) statistics for the TAR and MTAR models, respectively. Secondly, 
we test the null of no threshold cointegration effects (i.e. H20: 1 = 2) using the * and *(M) 
statistics for the TAR and MTAR models, respectively. Lastly, there is the null of no TEC 
effects (i.e. H30: 𝛾1𝑖𝑡
− = 𝛾2𝑖𝑡
+) using the FTEC and FTEC(M) statistics for the TAR and MTAR 
models, respectively. The thumb of rule is that only if the three hypotheses are rejected are we 
able proceed to estimate the TAR/MTAR models with their corresponding TEC components. 
Therefore we only provide a discussion for those regressions which manage to reject all three 
null hypotheses. Our empirical strategy involves testing these hypotheses on the time series 
data for i) periods before the crisis, and ii) periods after the crisis. The results of the empirical 
exercise are reported in Table 3 below.  
   
Table 3: Threshold cointegration and error correction test results 
 TAR  MTAR 
 t-Max* * FTEC  t-Max*(M) *(M) FTEC(M) 
Pre-crisis        
ALSIt 3.41 
(0.04)* 
4.62 
(0.03)* 
8.42 
(0.00)*** 
 1.20 
(0.31) 
0.22 
(0.59) 
0.24 
(0.63) 
Top.40t 3.11 
(0.05)* 
4.11 
(0.05)* 
8.44 
(0.00)*** 
 2.41 
(0.09)* 
2.73 
(0.10) 
3.09 
(0.08)* 
Ind.25t 3.05 
(0.05)* 
3.55 
(0.06)* 
8.01 
(0.00)*** 
 2.12 
(0.13) 
1.74 
(0.19) 
2.29 
(0.13) 
Res.10t 1.96 
(0.15) 
2.43 
(0.12) 
5.70 
(0.02)** 
 2.55 
(0.08)* 
3.59 
(0.06)* 
3.99 
(0.04)** 
        
Post-crisis        
ALSIt 7.71 
(0.00)*** 
9.13 
(0.00)*** 
4.88 
(0.03)** 
 7.16 
(0.00)*** 
8.09 
(0.00)*** 
1.60 
(0.21) 
Top.40t 7.87 
(0.00)*** 
8.57 
(0.00)*** 
3.03 
(0.08)* 
 7.62 
(0.00)*** 
8.11 
(0.00)*** 
1.02 
(0.32) 
Ind.25t 9.61 
(0.00)*** 
9.32 
(0.00)*** 
1.84 
(0.18) 
 5.05 
(0.00)*** 
1.02 
(0.31) 
0.14 
(0.71) 
Res.10t 7.57 
(0.00)*** 
7.51 
(0.00)*** 
2.12 
(0.09)* 
 6.91 
(0.00)*** 
6.28 
(0.00)*** 
2.12 
(0.09)* 
Notes: “****”, “**”, “*” denote the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in (). 
  
The top panel of Table 3 reports the results for the pre-crisis period whereas the bottom 
panel reports the results for the post-crisis period. From the top panel it is evident that TAR 
models best describe the cointegration relationship between the repo rate and the returns on the 
all-share index, the top 40 index and the industrial 25 index whereas we find a MTAR 
relationship between the repo rate and returns on the resource 10 index. In particular, for the 
TAR specifications, we obtain t-Max* statistics of 3.41 (ALSI), 3.11 (Top.40), 3.05 (Ind.25) 
which are significant at a 10 percent critical level; * statistics of 4.62 (ALSI), 4.11 (Top.40), 
3.55 (Ind.25) which are also significant at a 10 percent critical level; and FTEC statistics of 8.42 
(ALSI), 8.44 (Top.40), 8.01 (Ind.25) which are significant at all critical levels. On the other 
hand, for the MTAR model between the repo rate and the returns on the resource 10 index, we 
find t-Max*(M) statistic of 2.55 and *(M) statistic of 3.59, which are both significant at all 
critical levels whereas the FTEC(M) statistic of 3.00 exceed it’s 1 percent critical value. Overall, 
the empirical results confirm four estimation regressions for periods before the crisis. 
 
In the bottom panel of Table 3 we also find four significant threshold estimation 
regressions. The first three are TAR cointegration relations between the repo rate and returns 
on the all-share index, the top 40 index. The fourth is a MTAR regression between the repo 
rate and returns on the resource 10 index. Particularly, for the TAR regression we manage to 
obtain t-Max* statistics of 7.71 (ALSI), 7.87 (Top.40), 7.57 (Res.10) which are significant at 
all critical levels; * statistics of 9.13 (ALSI), 8.57 (Top.40), 7.51 (Res.10) which are also 
significant at all critical levels and FTEC statistics of 4.88 (ALSI), 3.03 (Top.40), 2.12 (Res.10) 
which are significant at a critical level of at least 10 percent. For the MTAR cointegration 
regression between the repo rate and returns on the Resource 10 index we find t-Max*(M) 
statistic of 6.91 and *(M) statistic of 6.28 which are both significant at all critical levels; 
whereas the FTEC(M) statistic produces a value of 2.21 which is significant at a 10 percent 
critical level. 
 
Collectively, the results reported in Table 3 point to at least one form of threshold 
convergence between the monetary policy instrument and returns on all four stock market 
indices whereas after the crisis there exist threshold convergence between the repo and returns 
on three disaggregated indices. This finding provides preliminary evidence of the global 
financial crisis altering convergence dynamics between the SARB policy instrument and JSE 
stock market returns. Bearing this in mind, we proceed to estimate the relevant TAR and 
MTAR regressions in order to assess the extent which the financial crisis altered the dynamic 
long-run and short-run convergence relations between the repo rate and returns to stock market 
indices.  
 5.3 Cointegration analysis and error correction estimates 
 
The left panel of Table 4 reports the results for periods before the crisis whereas the 
right panel reports the results for periods after the financial crisis. For periods prior to the 
financial crisis, we find significant long-run regression coefficients (1) estimates of -
0.10(ALSI), -0.11(Top.40), -0.12(Ind.25), and – 0.05(Res.10) and the coefficients on the first 
three indices are significant at all critical levels whereas the coefficient on the last index is only 
significant at a 10 percent critical level. For periods subsequent to the crisis the long-run 
coefficients for the indices (i.e. ALSI, Top.40 and Res.10) is at a much lower value of -0.01 
albeit these estimates being insignificant.  
 
Concerning the threshold equilibrium error terms, 1 and 2, for periods before the 
crisis, we obtain 1 estimates of -0.24(ALSI), -0.21(Top.40), -0.26(Ind.25) and -0.05(Res.10) 
whereas the values of 2 are -0.01(ALSI), -0.01(Top.40), -0.04(Ind.25) and -0.16(Res.10). 
Since the absolute values of 1 are larger than those of 2 for the ALSI, Top.40 and Ind.25 
variables, we conclude that for these indices positive deviations from the equilibrium are 
eradicated at a quicker rate than negative ones whereas for the Res.10 variable negative 
deviations are eradicated at a quicker rate than positive deviations. This means that for the pre-
crisis period the SARB reacted quicker to a bulls market in the ALSI, Top 40 and Ind. 25 
sectors whereas the Reserve Bank reacted quicker to a bears market for the Res. 10 sector. 
 
For periods subsequent to the financial crisis the absolute values of 1 (i.e. -0.06(ALSI) 
and -0.07(Top.40),) are smaller than those for 2 (i.e. -0.15(ALSI) and -0.15(Top.40), whereas 
for the Res.10 variable absolute values of 1 in the TAR (-0.07) and MTAR (-0.06) model 
remain smaller than their corresponding 2 values of -0.08 and -0,21 for the TAR and MTAR 
model, respectively. Therefore, for periods after the crisis the repo rate reacted quicker to bears 
market as opposed to a bulls market in the ALSI and Top.40 sectors whereas the opposite 
happens in the Res.10 sector where the repo rate responds quicker to bulls markets. We further 
note, that for both periods before and subsequent to the financial crisis the threshold error terms 
satisfy the convergence condition of 1 < 0, 2 < 0 and (1 +1)(1 + 2) < 0 thus verifying 
threshold convergence effects between the observed time series. 
 
Table 4: Estimation of TAR/MTAR models  
 Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
model type 
 
TAR TAR TAR MTAR  TAR TAR TAR MTAR 
independent 
variable 
ALSIt Top.40t Ind.25t Res.10t  ALSIt Top.40t Res.10t Res.10t 
0 10.11 
(0.00)*** 
10.10 
(0.00)*** 
10.08 
(0.00)*** 
10.05 
(0.00)*** 
 6.76 
(0.00)*** 
6.73 
(0.00)*** 
6.54 
(0.00)*** 
6.54 
(0.00)*** 
1 -0.11 
(0.00)*** 
-0.10 
(0.00)*** 
-0.12 
(0.00)*** 
-0.05 
(0.07)* 
 -0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.01 
(0.42) 
 
 1.77 1.65 1.85 -0.47  -0.45 -0.72 -0.79 -0.19 
 
1t-1 -0.24 
(0.00)*** 
-0.21 
(0.00)*** 
-0.26 
(0.00)*** 
-0.03 
(0.43) 
 -0.06 
(0.09)* 
-0.07 
(0.07)* 
-0.07 
(0.01)* * 
-0.06 
(0.01)** 
2t-1 -0.01 
(0.98) 
-0.01 
(0.98) 
-0.04 
(0.53) 
-0.16 
(0.03)* 
 -0.15 
(0.04)* 
-0.15 
(0.03)* 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.21 
(0.02)* 
Notes: “****”, “**”, “*” denote the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in (). 
 
The estimation of our TEC models as well as the associated causality tests are reported 
in Table 5. We find that during positive shock to the equity returns in periods before the crisis, 
the error correction term produces the correct negative and highly significant coefficients for 
the ALSI(-1.75), Top.40(-1.89) and Ind.25(-1.79) variables whereas during negative shocks 
only the Res.10 variable produces a negative and significant error correction coefficient of -
2.26. As eloquently explained by Burke and Hunter (2005), error correction terms can be 
interpreted with meaning if the associated coefficient is significant and lies between the values 
of 0 and -2. In the case in which the error correction coefficient lies between -1 and -2, then 
self-correcting convergence after a period of disequilibrium occurs within the data frequency 
of the time series. Bearing this in mind, we conclude that for periods before the crisis significant 
equilibrium correcting behaviour occurred only during negative shocks to the ALSI, Top.40 
and Ind.25 variables and such equilibrium correcting behaviour occurred within the data 
frequency of one month. Conversely, during periods subsequent to the crisis all negative and 
significant error correction terms are produced for negative shocks to equity returns i.e. ALSI(-
16.48), Top.40(-12.62), Res.10(-10.83 and -18.67 for TAR and MTAR models, respectively). 
However, we note that the aforementioned TEC coefficients surplus their cut-off point of -2, 
hence these coefficients cannot be interpreted with any purposeful meaning. 
 
All-in-all, our empirical estimates of TEC models imply that for periods prior to the 
financial crisis the Reserve Bank seemed to be mainly concerned (or monitored) with positive 
shocks (i.e. bulls market) to equity returns whereas subsequent to the crisis the Reserve Bank 
has mainly monitored negative shocks to the equity returns (i.e. bears market). We note that 
this result is in coherence with those obtained from our long-run regression estimates in which 
we found that for the pre-crisis period positive deviations where eradicated faster than negative 
ones whereas after the crisis the opposite happens. We also note that significant and negative 
error correction estimates are obtained for the return to stock index variable in both sub-sample 
periods thus indicating that equity returns are weakly exogenous in the system. This finding is 
re-iterated and strengthened by the causality tests reported at the bottom of Table 5. As can be 
observed from Table 5, in testing the null that stock returns do not granger cause interest rates 
for periods before the crisis, we obtain F-statistics of 11.59 (ALSI), 12.94 (Top.40), 10.27 
(Ind.25) and 15.45 (Res.10) and all these statistics manage to reject the tested null at all levels 
of significance. Similarly, in testing the same null that stock returns do not lead to interest rates 
for periods subsequent to the crisis, we obtain F-statistics of 21.21 (ALSI), 22.05 (Top.40), 
17.40 (Res.10 (TAR)) and 15.45 (Res.10 (MTAR)) and all these statistics manage to reject the 
tested null at all critical levels. On the other hand, we are unable to find any evidence that 
interest rates lead to equity returns in both sample periods as the F-statistics testing the null that 
interest rates do not lead equity returns cannot be rejected and we attribute this unconventional 
finding to our long-run model specification which is particularly designed to assess the effects 
of equity returns on the repo rate and not vice versa (i.e. repo rate is the dependent variable in 
the long run regression).  
  
Table 5: TEC estimates and causality tests 
Pre-crisis 
 TAR TAR TAR MTAR 
 Δrepot ΔALSIt Δrepot ΔTop.40t Δrepot ΔInd.25t Δrepot ΔRes.10t 
         
+t-1 -0.05 
(0.17) 
-1.75 
(0.00)*** 
-0.07 
(0.08)* 
-1.89 
(0.00)*** 
-0.04 
(0.36) 
-1.79 
(0.00)*** 
-0.03 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.66) 
-t-1 -0.02 
(0.43) 
0.74 
(0.09)* 
-0.01 
(0.75) 
1.01 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
0.64 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.43) 
-2.26 
(0.05)* 
 
H04  11.59 
(0.00)*** 
 12.94 
(0.00)*** 
 10.27 
(0.00)*** 
 15.45 
(0.00)*** 
H05  1.04 
(0.36) 
 1.29 
(0.28) 
 1.53 
(0.22) 
 0.87 
(0.42) 
R2 0.09 0.33 0.11 0.33 0.06 0.31 0.10 0.30 
DW 2.17 2.13 2.17 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.13 2.15 
LB 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post-crisis 
 TAR TAR TAR MTAR 
 repot ALSIt repot Top.40t repot Res.10t repot Res.10t 
+t-1 0.07 
(0.02)* 
3.30 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.02)** 
1.66 
(0.60) 
0.07 
(0.00)*** 
0.71 
(0.83) 
0.06 
(0.01)* 
-0.41 
(0.89) 
-t-1 0.04 
(0.53) 
-16.48 
(0.02)** 
0.05 
(0.40) 
-12.62 
(0.05)** 
0.03 
(0.63) 
-10.83 
(0.09)* 
0.09 
(0.36) 
-18.67 
(0.09)* 
 
F[H04]  21.21 
(0.00)*** 
 22.05 
(0.00)*** 
 17.40 
(0.00)*** 
 11.97 
(0.00)*** 
F[H05]  2.01 
(0.14) 
 2.02 
(0.11) 
 1.06 
(0.35) 
 0.45 
(0.64) 
R2 0.18 0.41 0.20 0.46 0.18 0.41 0.18 0.49 
DW 2.00 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.00 2.01 1.94 2.00 
LB 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Notes: “****”, “**”, “*” denote the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in (). DW and LB represent the 
Durbin-Watson and Ljung-Box diagnostic test statistics for autocorrelation and both statistics indicate that all estimated regressions are free 
of serial correlation. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The primary objective of this study was to examine how the SARB has responded to 
changes in equity returns for periods prior and subsequent to the global financial crisis of 2008. 
To do so, we made use of the MTAR cointegration framework, and applied the model to two 
monthly datasets, one corresponding to periods before the crisis (i.e. 2002:01 - 2008:08) and 
the other corresponding to periods subsequent to the crisis (i.e. 2008:08 - 2016:12). Our 
empirical analysis reveals a number of interesting phenomenon. For one, we note a negative 
and significant long-run relationship between interest rates and equity returns for periods 
before the financial crisis whereas this relationship turns insignificant in periods subsequent to 
the crisis. Furthermore, our empirical results also reveal that prior to the crisis, interest rates 
responded quicker to positive discrepancies in most equity returns whereas for periods 
subsequent to the crisis, the repo responded quicker to negative divergences in equity returns. 
Finally, in terms of granger causality, we find that equity returns lead to interest rate in both 
subsample periods.  
 
From a policy perspective, we firstly highlight the evidence of the Reserve Bank 
responding to equity returns in both sample periods even though a significant long-run 
relationship is only established between the two variables for periods prior to the financial 
crisis. This result is plausible seeing that since the adoption of the inflation targeting regime in 
2002, the SARB has placed some emphasis on monitoring asset prices, due to the fact that 
changes in asset prices contribute to domestic levels of inflation. Thus, despite conventional 
claims that the SARB was not concerned with asset price movements before the crisis, our 
empirical result indicate that the Reserve Bank was concerned with monitoring equity returns 
in the interest of keeping inflation within it’s target. Note that our empirical results simply 
imply that the SARB monitored equity returns but did not necessarily target these returns. Our 
results further show that, prior to the crisis, the Reserve Bank has been more responsive to bulls 
markets than bears markets and this result is also plausible because rapidly escalating bulls 
markets are a foretelling sign of bubbles in equity prices.  
 
However, following the advent of the financial crisis and the resulting global recession 
period, the role of monetary policy has been primarily managing the cyclical down turn. This 
has caused the SARB to be pre-occupied with lowering inflation to it’s designated target as 
well as on closing the negative output gap via countercyclical policies. Therefore, there appears 
to have been little role for monetary authorities in monitoring equity prices and henceforth in 
the post-crisis period, we empirically find an insignificant relationship between the repo rate 
and equity returns. Nonetheless, the financial crisis has re-ignited concerns around the extent 
to which monetary policy should react to movement in asset prices. Currently, the SARB has 
increased emphasis on macropudential policy which requires that monetary policy should 
focuses on endogenous risks such asset price growth. However, there has been little indication 
on whether the Reserve Bank will directly incorporate asset prices into their policy reaction 
function. The fact still remains that, in the post-crisis period, it is important that the Reserve 
Bank should at least be monitoring equity returns since they reflect developments in the 
financial and real sectors of the economy. 
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